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Abstract 
 
This article applies a three-regime Markov switching model to investigate the impact of the 
macroeconomy on the dynamics of the residential real estate market in the US. Focusing on the 
period between 1960 and 2011, the methodology implemented allows for a clearer understanding 
of the drivers of the real estate market in “boom”, “steady-state” and “crash” regimes. Our 
results show that the sensitivity of the real estate market to economic changes is regime-
dependent. The paper then proceeds to examine whether policymakers are able to influence a 
regime switch away from the crash regime. We find that a decrease in interest rate spreads could 
be an effective catalyst to precipitate such a change of state.    
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1. Introduction 
Over the last few decades, residential property markets in many industrialised nations across the 
globe have witnessed large cyclical variations in prices and volumes. Real estate cycles are often 
characterised by a surge in prices followed by a fall or crash. An example of this was seen in the 
UK housing market in the late 1980s. Financial liberalization in the UK led to a price boom, but 
following an increase in interest rates, residential prices experienced a sharp decline in the early 
1990s. More recently in the US, nationwide property prices grew by over 61% between 2000 and 
2005 but fell sharply by 38% in the four years that followed. There are similar examples in other 
countries including Japan, Ireland and Spain. These cycles are often linked with changes in 
macroeconomic drivers such as interest rates and economic growth. 
This cyclical nature of the residential real estate market has been a major topic of discussion over 
the years mainly because a large proportion of the average household’s wealth is invested in 
property. The housing market in the US accounts for more than 50% of the country’s fixed 
capital stock (Baffoe-Bonnie, 1998). Economic theory suggests that wealth is one of the key 
drivers of aggregate consumption in any economy, and so therefore, a downturn in the housing 
market is likely to be followed by a decrease in household consumption levels, which may in turn 
have adverse effects on the growth rate of an economy. Empirical evidence of this is shown in 
Case et al. (2001), who use a panel of 14 countries in their study to present statistical evidence 
that a 10% rise in housing wealth would lead to a 1.1% increase in consumption.  
The behaviour of the residential real estate market is also important because of the impact of 
house price falls on the lending portfolios of commercial banks and other financial institutions. 
Wheelock (2006) shows that a period of large declines in house prices is  very often followed by 
an increase in the rate of mortgage defaults, which has an adverse effect on banks’ profits. The 
reduction in profitability may lead to failures in banks and other real estate lenders and a 
subsequent slowdown in economic activity. A recent high profile example of this was the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers which was heavily exposed to the real estate market via mortgage 
backed securities. Following the failure of Lehmans in September 2008, the CBOE Volatility 
Index (VIX), often referred to as the “fear index”, jumped 70%,1 and a global recession followed 
shortly thereafter. In their empirical study, Ghent and Owyang (2010) provide evidence that 
house price changes drive business cycles. Thus, given the potentially detrimental effects of 
                                                          
1 Whaley (2000) concludes that the VIX index is a gauge for investors’ fears as it provides an aggregate view 
of their expectations of volatility in the stock market. 
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declining housing prices on the economy, a deeper understanding of the economic drivers of the 
residential real estate market is required.  
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how changes in key macroeconomic variables could 
influence the growth in house prices, depending on which part of the cycle the real estate market 
is in. This study examines the impact of macroeconomic drivers of real estate price changes in a 
three-regime-switching context, thus providing information on how selected economic factors 
influence price changes in the residential real estate market depending on whether the housing 
market is a “boom”, “steady-state” or “crash” regime. The paper further contributes to the 
existing literature by investigating the likelihood of monetary policy tools precipitating a switch 
from a crash regime.  
Most prior studies on this topic do not allow for significant structural breaks in house prices 
resulting from huge upswings and collapses in prices, instead assuming that the relationship 
between house prices and economic variables is stable and consistent. The sensitivity of house 
prices to changes in these variables could, however, depend on the stage in the housing cycle.  
Failing to account specifically for volatile periods such as the period between 2000 and 2012 in 
the US housing market could produce results which may not reflect a true picture of the 
relationship between macro factors and growth in house prices. Xiao (2007) and Nneji et al. 
(2013a), studying the residential property market in Hong Kong and the US respectively, provide 
evidence that structural breaks in real estate prices caused by speculative bubbles are likely to 
disconnect the housing market from the cost of renting. As a result, the relationship between the 
housing market and its macroeconomic determinants may be regime-varying, and so accounting 
for the housing market cycle is critical when examining its response to external macroeconomic 
factors. We seek to address several policy-relevant questions in this research. First, is the housing 
market more sensitive to economic changes in boom or bust periods? Second, which economic 
factor(s) has(have) the strongest impact on the housing market in each regime or cycle? Third, is 
it possible for policymakers to influence a switch away from the “bust” state (typically 
characterised by negative growth) using monetary policy tools?  
Studying the US housing market between 1960 and 2011, we apply a three state Markov 
switching model to examine the possibility that macroeconomic drivers of house price changes 
are regime-specific. The regime-switching methodology implemented in this paper also enables 
us to identify cycles in the housing market. We can then evaluate whether policymakers are able 
to switch the housing market from a crash regime to a steady state simply by using monetary 
policy tools. To our knowledge, this is the first study that applies a three Markov switching 
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model in the context of the relationship between the real estate market and the macroeconomy, 
and the first study that examines the efficacy of policy tools for causing a switch away from the 
“crash” regime. 
The layout of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 is dedicated to reviewing the existing 
literature on the relationship between economic variables and the residential real estate market. 
The following section, Section 3, provides descriptive statistics for the data used in the paper. In 
Section 4 a more detailed explanation of the methodologies implemented is given. Section 5 
interprets and discusses the results from the Markov switching regressions, and in Section 6 we 
examine the power of monetary policy tools in influencing a switch in the housing market from a 
crash regime. We conclude in Section 7. 
  
2. Literature Review  
The literature on the macroeconomic determinants of house prices is vast. For many years, 
especially before the subprime mortgage market crisis of the late 2000s, researchers used linear 
models to examine the relationship between the macroeconomy and the dynamics of house 
prices. These papers have generally applied regression analyses to evaluate how growth in real 
estate prices is being driven by economic factors including interest rates, inflation, the 
unemployment rate, economic growth.  
The majority of these papers identify interest rates as the most important explanatory variable. 
One early study is Abraham and Hendershott (1992). Using pooled cross-sectional data on 
metropolitan house prices in the US between 1977 and 1991, they find that macroeconomic 
factors including interest rates and employment are significant in influencing house prices. 
Iacoviello and Minetti (2003) argue that, over time, house prices became more sensitive to 
interest rate changes due to financial liberalization in European countries including the UK. 
More recently, this sentiment is shared by Himmelberg et al. (2005), who show the importance 
of interest rates to house price changes. The authors also find that the sensitivity of house prices 
to long-term interest rates intensifies when rates had been relatively low in the recent past. 
Furthermore, they cite that house prices are even more sensitive to long-term interest rates in 
cities where values grow relatively faster. Adams and Füss (2010) distinguish the impact of short 
term from long term interest rates on real estate price dynamics. They argue that short term 
interest rates adversely affect demand for houses mainly because of the effect on mortgage rates 
and the cost of financing for construction firms. Holly and Jones (1997), McQuinn and O’Reilly 
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(2007) and Bouchouicha and Ftiti (2012) have also investigated the link between the real estate 
market and interest rates. 
 
Other papers have established that price dynamics in the real estate market may be influenced by 
macroeconomic factors other than interest rates. For example, Lastrapes (2002), using a vector 
autoregressive model, attributes short run increases in house prices to positive money shocks. 
Brunnermeier and Julliard (2008) conclude that inflation, not real interest rate changes, 
influences the price-rent ratio as it is a signal of a likely future downturn in the economy. 
Investigating the linkage between macroeconomic fluctuations and international house prices, 
Beltratti and Morana (2009) estimate that 40% of the variation in house prices in G-7 countries 
is caused by global macroeconomic shocks. The study by Adams and Füss (2010) provides 
evidence that variables linked with economic activity such as industrial production, the level of 
unemployment and money supply influence demand for housing and house price. Other papers 
that study the macroeconomy-housing relationship on an international scale include Englund 
and Iaonnides (1997), Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) and Glindro et al. (2011). 
As discussed above, only a handful of studies have accounted for the housing cycle when 
examining the relationship between house prices and the macroeconomy. A notable exception is 
the research by Hall et al. (1997), who use a two-regime switching error-correction approach to 
develop a macroeconomic model for UK house prices which accounts for booms and busts. 
Their paper uses a Markov regime-switching approach, assuming that there are only two distinct 
regimes in the housing market – “boom” and “bust”. The present paper adds a third regime 
which we call “steady-state” based on the premise that the US housing market may have been in 
a dormant state where prices are growing at a small steady rate. In this state, the housing market 
is neither booming nor declining in prices. This can be observed in the early 1990s where 
nominal house prices grew by an average of just 3% per annum in contrast to the early 2000s 
boom of 11% annual growth and the late 2000s bust which saw prices decline by an average of 
6% per year. Furthermore, this study builds on the work by Hall et al. as we model the 
government’s ability to affect a regime shift, which thus has policy implications.   
3. Data 
The data employed in this study consist of sets of 203 quarterly observations from 1960Q1 to 
2011Q3. For residential property market prices, the data are supplied by the Lincoln Institute of 
Land Policy, constructed using the methodology of Davis et al. (2008). In order to compute this 
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series, Davis et al. use interpolation procedures to adjust the quarterly changes in the Freddie 
Mac Conventional Mortgage House Price Index (CMHPI) in order to connect the series with the 
Decennial Census of Housing benchmark levels. The price series used in this study is adjusted 
for inflation. 
In this paper, we employ inflation, disposable income growth, the short rate and the term 
structure of interest rates (also referred to as the yield curve or interest rate spread) as key 
economic variables that influence housing demand. These variables have been selected because 
of their significant contribution to the dynamics of house prices suggested in the literature. For 
example, studying the effect of economic risk factors on growth in the US commercial real estate 
market, Ling and Naranjo (1997) identify unexpected inflation, yield spread and the Treasury bill 
rate as its key drivers. Similarly, the study by Brooks and Tsolacos (1999) shows that the term 
structure and unexpected inflation explain changes in the UK property market. Englund and 
Ioannides (1997) find that lagged interest rate and influences house price dynamics in 15 OECD 
countries. Using a life-cycle model of the property market, Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006) show 
that house price dynamics are driven by disposable income.  
These drivers are likely to have the following impacts on real estate prices. An increase in the rate 
of interest is expected to drive borrowing rates up, thus increasing the cost of servicing 
mortgages. This would, in turn, lead to a decrease in demand for properties and a subsequent fall 
in prices. Rising interest rates might additionally be expected to lead to an increase in the number 
of defaults on mortgages (especially adjustable-rate mortgages), which could also lead to a fall in 
prices. An increase in the term structure means that the gap between long and short term rates 
widens. When this happens, market agents would expect future increases in the short term 
interest rate and so house prices may fall. In addition, most housing finance is arranged at the 
long maturity end, and thus upward twists in the yield curve will also lead to rises in borrowing 
costs for mortgage holders. Growth in disposable income is expected to have a positive impact 
on the housing market whilst the effect of inflation on the market should be negative.    
The explanatory variables are constructed as follows. The short term rate used is the yield on 3-
month US Treasury bills. The disposable personal income measure used in the paper is obtained 
from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. It is the proportion of income available to 
individuals for spending after deducting personal current taxes. The term structure is constructed 
by taking the difference between the long rate and the short rate. We take the constant maturity 
rate on 10-year Treasuries as a proxy for the long interest rate. The inflation rate is computed 
from the Consumer Price Index (CPI) series. The economic data series are retrieved from the 
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online database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.2  A set of summary statistics for our 
sample is presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Here, HP, CPI, INC, LTR, STR and TS are acronyms for house prices, the consumer price index, disposable 
income, long term interest rates, short term interest rates and the term structure, respectively. The symbol “Δ” 
represents the percentage changes in the series. Note that the data series for house prices and interest rates are 
adjusted for inflation. 
Δ HP Δ CPI Δ INC LTR STR TS
Mean 0.29% 0.98% 0.54% 5.67% 4.72% 0.95%
Maximum 4.53% 3.80% 4.33% 13.40% 13.54% 3.35%
Minimum -8.30% -2.38% -2.55% 1.67% -0.88% -1.94%
Skewness -1.86 0.67 -0.02 1.14 0.67 0.05
Kurtosis 8.95 5.98 5.23 4.16 4.15 2.58
 
  
The descriptive statistics on house prices, CPI and INC are the percentage changes of these 
series, thus representing the house price growth rate, inflation rate and disposable income 
growth rate, respectively. From the table, it is clear that the average real growth in house prices is 
a modest 0.29% per quarter or 1.17% per annum. Prices have grown as much as 4.53% during 
the boom years, whilst in market downturns such as the recent crash, price falls have been more 
severe (-8.30%). The distribution of returns on investing in the housing market is negatively 
skewed, thus implying that it has a longer left tail. Another key factor to note is that the 
distribution of house price growth is leptokurtic (i.e. kurtosis greater than 3), which implies that 
the data are highly concentrated around the mean. The second column refers to the percentage 
changes in CPI, i.e. the inflation rate. From our sample, the average quarterly rate of inflation is 
0.98%, which equates to an annual inflation rate of almost 4%. The real growth in disposable 
income, denoted by the percentage change in INC, has an average of 0.54% per quarter or 
2.16% per year. The greatest drop in income in our sample set is -2.55%, occurring at the end of 
2008, which was fuelled by the economic decline caused by the “meltdown” of the subprime 
mortgage market. The early 1980s saw the highest short and long term interest rates, 13.40% and 
13.54%, respectively. As for the term structure, it has an average of 0.95% and a maximum of 
3.35%.  
 
4. Methodology 
                                                          
2 For more information on the original sources of the data, see the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis: http://www.research.stlouisfed.org/ 
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As stated earlier in this paper, most of the studies that have attempted to examine the 
relationship between economic variables and the real estate market (either commercial or 
residential) have used linear regression type models. For example, Levin and Wright (1997) use a 
pooled cross-sectional regression approach to regress house prices on several explanatory 
variables including real interest rates while Hort (1998) applies an error correction model to 
study the impact of demand and supply-based market fundamentals on house prices in Sweden. 
Other examples include the papers reviewed in Section 2.  
Building on from these studies, in this paper, we apply a three-regime univariate Markov 
switching (MS) model due to Hamilton (1989, 1994). This methodology allows us to study the 
nonlinear relationship between the growth in house prices and changes to economic 
fundamentals:  
1 1 1 1,0 ,1 1 ,2 1 ,3 1 ,4 1t t t t t tt S S t S t S t S t S
HP STR TS CPI INC     
      
               (1)  
where  2, ~ 0,t tS t SN   and tS i (for i = 1, 2 or 3)    
The estimated betas from model (1) can be interpreted as a measure of the sensitivity of house 
price growth to changes in the interest rate, term structure, inflation and disposable income. 
Notice that these explanatory variables are lagged and not contemporaneous because, unlike 
other asset classes such as the stock market, changes in the economy are expected to have a 
delayed effect on the housing market. This formulation also avoids the possible concern that 
there may potentially be an endogeneity problem if there are feedbacks from the housing market 
to the macroeconomy or if house price dynamics affect monetary policy. We assume the lag time 
to be one quarter. 
Our model is a three-regime MS model, where the term St is the latent state variable which could 
take the value of 1, 2 or 3 depending on the state or regime in the housing market. In other 
words, the effect of each of the explanatory economic variables depends on the housing cycle i.e. 
whether there is a boom, bust or steady growth in the housing market. This unobservable state 
variable is governed by a first order Markov chain with a constant transition probability matrix 
(P): 
     
     
     
1 1 1 11 12 13
1 1 1 21 22 23
1 1 1 31 32 33
Pr 1| 1 Pr 2 | 1 Pr 3 | 1
Pr 1| 2 Pr 2 | 2 Pr 3 | 2
Pr 1| 3 Pr 2 | 3 Pr 3 | 3
t t t t t t
t t t t t t
t t t t t t
S S S S S S p p p
S S S S S S p p p
S S S S S S p p p
  
  
  
        
              
           
   (2)  
where ijp are the transition probabilities from state i to state j.  
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The MS model is estimated using a maximum likelihood procedure. Under the assumption that 
the error term  t  is normally distributed, the density of ty  conditional on the regime  i  is 
represented as: 
 
 
2
1
, 1 22
1
| , , ; exp
22 ii
t t i
i t t t t t
y X
f y S i X

 



  
     
  
      (3)  
where,  1 1 2 1 2, ,..., , ,...t t t t ty y X X       represents all the past information to time t–1,   is the 
vector of parameters  2,0 ,1 ,2 ,3 ,4 00 11 22, , , , , , , ,t t t t t tS S S S S S p p p     

 to be estimated. Note that 
ty  is the dependent variable while tX   is the vector of explanatory variables. The conditional 
density of the observation at time t  is obtained from the joint density of ty  and tS : 
       1 1 1 1| ; , 1| ; , 2 | ; , 3 | ;t t t t t t t t t t tf y f y S f y S f y S                   (4) 
which is equivalent to: 
   
3
1 1
1
| , ; | ;t t t t t
i
f y S i P S i  

              (5) 
As it is impossible to know for certain what regime the housing market is in, inference about the 
regime is made by observing the growth rate of house prices. The inference comes in the form 
of filtered probabilities  jt , which are computed recursively using historical information, 1t : 
 
 
3
, 1
1
1
Pr | ;
| ;
ij i t jt
i
jt t t
t t
p
S j
f y
 
 




   


         (6) 
These filtered probabilities depend on real-time updated information up to time t. It is also 
interesting to compute probabilities of what state/regime the housing market was in at a 
previous date t using all the observations and information obtained through a later date T. These 
are known as smoothed probabilities   | Pr | ;it T t TS i    , and they are computed using an 
algorithm developed by Kim (1994). Estimation of the parameters   in the MS model is done by 
maximizing the following log-likelihood function: 
   1
1
| ;
T
t t
t
f y 

 l                (7) 
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5. Results 
Before applying the three-regime MS model, we examine the same regression in equation (1) for 
the whole period using a standard linear ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation procedure. In 
this OLS model, the subscript St is omitted from the right hand side variables of the equation. 
Note that the estimated coefficients are standardised following the approach introduced by Bring 
(1994). This allows us to determine the relative importance of the selected explanatory variable, 
thereby making it easier to interpret the output from the OLS model. The results are shown in 
Table 2.  
 
Table 2: OLS Model Output 
We present a linear regression model of equation (1) for a single regime using ordinary least squares estimation 
procedure. This time series regression analysis is performed on the whole sample between 1960 and 2011. The 
dependent variable is the quarterly change in house prices and the independent variables are the changes in the 
short term interest rate (ΔSR), the term spread (ΔTS), inflation rates (ΔCPI), and disposable income (ΔINC). The 
figures in parentheses are the p-values and the grey shade indicates variables that are statistically significant (10% 
at least).   
-0.0020 -0.2283 -0.1935 -0.0389 0.1645
(0.35) (0.01) (0.03) (0.58) (0.02)
β
Δ INCΔ TSΔ SR Δ CPIConstant
 
In this linear single state model, the sign of the short term interest rate is negative and it is 
statistically significant, implying that an increase in the rate of interest would have a negative 
effect on house prices, as expected. The term structure is also negative as anticipated and it is a 
statistically significant driver of house price dynamics. The inflation rate parameter estimate is 
positive but statistically insignificant. Growth in disposable income, however, does have a 
relatively large and positive beta, which implies that an increase in disposable income is expected 
to have the most significant positive effect on house prices of all the economic variables 
investigated. These results raise crucial questions, such as whether it is really true that the 
inflation rate has no effect on real house prices, and also, whether it is the case that the sensitivity 
of the housing market to economic changes remains constant between different regimes. 
Implementing the three-regime MS model provides answers to these questions. 
Table 3: Determining the appropriate number of regimes using information criteria 
In this table, we compare the Akaike (AIC), Hannan-Quinn (HQIC) and Schwartz (SIC) information criterion to 
determine the optimal number of regimes to be used to model house price changes.  
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-6.4652
-6.2029
-6.0142
AIC
HQIC
SIC
3 RegimesInformation Criterion 2 Regimes 4 Regimes1 Regime
-6.4518-6.1473-5.2731
-6.2748-6.0424-5.2403
-6.0142-5.8880-5.1920
 
Note that in order to prove that the statistically appropriate number of regimes is three, we 
observe and compare the Hannan-Quinn, Akaike and Schwarz information criteria of two-, 
three- and four-regime versions of the MS model. A two-regime model would imply that there is 
just a “boom” and “bust” state while a four-regime model would signify a “crash”, “boom”, 
“slow growth” and “recovery” (Ryden et al., 1998 and Guidolin and Timmermann, 2008). In our 
case, we find that the Hannan-Quinn and Schwarz information criteria using all the different 
regime approaches are smallest in the three-regime Markov Switching model, thus we infer that 
the optimal number of regimes to be used is three: “boom”, “steady-state” and “bust”. This is 
shown in Table 3. AIC selects four regimes, but the criterion value is only slightly higher for the 
three-regime model; we consider four regimes to represent an over-parameterisation of the data, 
and therefore we implement the three-regime approach. The table also highlights the inadequacy 
of the linear model specification, since the values of all three information criteria are far inferior 
for the 1-regime (i.e. linear) model than for any of the switching models.  
Prior to discussing the estimated regime-dependent betas, it is important to view and discuss the 
estimated smoothed probabilities of the housing market being in any of these growth regimes. 
These probabilities allow us to make statistical inferences about the regime in which the housing 
market resides at each point in time by observing the complete dataset. Recall, the smoothed 
probabilities are dependent on the estimated transition probability matrix which provides 
information on the probability of a switch from one state at time t - 1 to another at time t as 
depicted in equation (2). The estimated transition probability matrix is shown in equation (8): 
 
11 12 13
21 22 23
31 32 33
0.953 0.025 0.039
0.047 0.951 0.000
0.000 0.024 0.960
p p p
p p p
p p p
   
     
   
      
       (8) 
where 1 = Steady-State, 2 = Boom and 3 = Crash regime. 
The probability of remaining in the crash regime given that the housing market was in the crash 
regime in the previous period is 96%, meaning that this is the most persistent regime in the 
housing market over the last 50 years. There is a 2% chance of switching from the steady-state 
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regime to the boom regime, whilst there is a 3.9% chance of a transition to a crash regime when 
prices are growing steadily. The boom regime has the least persistence in that there is a 95.1% 
probability of remaining in the boom period if there was a boom in the last quarter. With these 
transition probabilities, it is also possible to compute the expected duration (ED) of being in 
each of the regimes. This is simply calculated using the following formula: 
 
 
1
1 ii
ED
p


             (9) 
Therefore, the expected duration of being in the steady-state, boom and crash regimes are 
roughly 21, 20 and 25 quarters, respectively. This means that we would expect a steady growth 
and housing boom regimes to last for five years and a housing bust last for just over six years. A 
graphical representation of the smoothed probabilities is given in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: House price dynamics and regimes 
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From Figure 1, we note that the dominant state is as expected steady-state although the stability 
of the market is quite clearly disturbed by the policy changes that took place in the 2000s. It is 
clear that in the 1960s, real house prices grew at a steady pace of below 2% per quarter, until the 
market witnessed a dip. This dip coincided with the 11 month recession of the late 1960s as 
noted by the National Bureau of Economic Research. However, the housing market soon 
returned to its steady state and then a boom as prices picked up in the early 1970s. This lasted 
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until towards the end of the decade, which saw a transition back to the steady-state regime and 
house price growth slowed. From then on, house prices continued to grow steadily, averaging 
just over 1% per quarter until the turn of the decade. Following the collapse of the tech bubble 
at the end of the 1990s, policymakers reacted by adopting expansionary monetary actions. This 
involved severe interest rate cuts, which made borrowing a lot cheaper than in previous years. 
Furthermore, deregulation meant that the securitization market grew significantly, making it 
easier for borrowers to obtain mortgages. House prices began rising faster than they had done at 
any time in the previous 40 years and there was a transition to the boom regime. Several papers 
including Shiller (2007), Coleman et al. (2008) and Nneji et al. (2013b), attribute this period’s 
growth in prices to the existence of a speculative bubble in the market. A crash then followed 
this during 2000 – 2005, which saw the biggest drop in house prices in recent history, and there 
was a meltdown in the mortgage market. Although there were two consecutive quarters in 2009 
which saw real house prices grow by almost 5% combined, further dips occurred and the market 
soon reverted back to the crash regime. Table 4 provides the estimated parameters of the MS 
model which aims to provide a detailed insight into how these four economic variables influence 
the growth in house prices in the three regimes. 
 
Table 4: Markov Switching Model Output 
. This time series regression analysis is performed on the whole sample between 1960 and 2011. The dependent 
variable is the quarterly change in house prices and the independent variables are the changes in the short term 
interest rate (ΔSR), the term spread (ΔTS), inflation rates (ΔCPI), and disposable income (ΔINC). The figures in 
parentheses are the p-values and the grey shade indicates variables that are statistically significant (at the 10% 
level or better).   
0.0037 -0.1165 -0.0053 -0.1431 0.1280
(0.01) (0.00) (0.90) (0.00) (0.01)
0.019 -0.1025 -0.0928 -0.2491 0.0028
(0.00) (0.15) (0.08) (0.00) (0.96)
-0.0204 -0.3961 -0.2226 -0.1785 0.2686
(0.01) (0.30) (0.64) (0.68) (0.54)
Steady-State
Boom 
Bust
Δ INCΔ TSRegime Δ SR Δ CPIConstant
 
From Table 4, there are clear differences in the signs, significances and sizes of the estimated 
betas depending on the regime. Note that the estimated coefficients are also standardised in 
order to enable us to easily compare the relative importance of each of the explanatory variables. 
For example, changes in the short term interest rate influence the housing market in the steady-
state and boom regimes only. Focusing on the size of the coefficients, it is clear that interest rate 
cuts have a more severe effect on the growth of house prices in the steady-state regime than in 
any other regime. Similar to our finding from the linear model that the term spread influences 
growth of house prices, in the boom regime, an increase in the term spread or a widening of the 
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gap between long and short term interest rates is expected to cause a fall in the growth rate of 
house prices, perhaps as a result of investors’ expectations of future increases in the cost of 
borrowing. In the steady-state and crash regimes, the term spread has no effect on house price 
dynamics. However, unlike the linear model which depicted that the rate of inflation was 
statistically insignificant, we find that inflation does in fact have an effect on the growth of house 
prices in the boom and steady-state regimes. The last driving variable to be examined is 
disposable income growth. In the MS model, percentage changes in disposable income positively 
influence growth in house prices in the steady-state regime only.  
 
6. Is monetary policy a catalyst in instigating a switch from the crash regime? 
It is worth mentioning that the housing market becomes completely insensitive to changes in the 
economic variables in the crash regime; none of the variables are seen to have any effect on 
house price changes. Given these findings, it is clear that monetary variables affect the real estate 
market within a regime, but could policymakers instigate a transition from the crash regime to 
either the steady-state or a boom regime? In order to answer this question, we employ a probit 
model. We observe the filtered probabilities generated from the estimation of the MS model, 
focusing on the probability of being in the crash regime. The probit model is a binary 
specification, and thus we assign 1 (y =1) if the observed filtered probability (y*) of being in the 
crash regime is greater than 0.33 (as there are three regimes) and 0 otherwise – i.e., the left hand 
variable of the probit model, y, equals 1 if the probability of being in the bust regime is greater 
than 33%. This allows us to examine whether monetary policy tools such as the short term 
interest rate, the term spread and the level of money supply (M2) could be used by policymakers 
to instigate a switch away from the crash regime. We also include a macroprudential tool 
available to policymakers – the loan-to-income ratio. Here, “loan” refers to the home mortgage 
debt outstanding in the economy. This is a leverage proxy used in measuring how easy it is to 
obtain credit, whereby a high ratio represents easy credit conditions. Thus in this section, we 
measure how alterations to these policy tools could reduce the probability of being in the crash 
regime. The probit model is as follows: 
     * 0 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1Pr 0.33 Pr 1| t t t ty y x F dummyLTI dummySR dummyMS dummyTS              
              (10) 
where dummyLTI, dummySR, dummyMS and dummyTS refer to dummy variables which assign 1 
when there are increases in the loan-to-income ratio, short term interest rate, money supply or 
term spread, respectively and 0 when there are no changes or decreases occur.  
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In this probit model, F(.) follows a cumulative normal distribution: 
     
x
F x x z dz

                           (11) 
where the normal density function, (z), is given by: 
 
2
exp
2
2
z
z

 
 
               (12) 
A statistically significant positive αi (i=1,2,3) would imply that an increase in the value of one of 
these monetary tools would increase the probability of remaining in the crash regime in the next 
quarter whilst a negative αi that is statistically significant implies the reverse. This part of the 
study provides information as to whether monetary policy approaches may be suitable for 
periods of severe downturns in the housing market. The results of the probit regressions are 
reported in Table 5. 
Table 5: Probit Model Output (Including LTI) 
We present the probit model parameter estimates as stated in equation (9). The figures in parentheses are p-values 
and the grey shade indicates variables that are statistically significant (at the 10% level or better). The McFadden and 
Estrella R-squared figures for these probit maximum likelihood estimates are 0.03 and 0.02, respectively. 
-1.1281 -0.0998 0.1410 0.4212 -0.2015
(0.00) (0.65) (0.55) (0.07) (0.39)
α
dummy TSdummySR dummyMSConstant dummyLTI
 
It is immediately obvious from Table 5 that, apart from the intercept, only one variable, the term 
spread, has a statistically significant parameter estimate. This implies that changes to short term 
interest rate levels and the money supply would have no effect on forcing the housing market 
away from the crash regime. Therefore, in times of significant crashes in the housing market as 
recently witnessed, money supply increases or short term interest rate cuts would not be 
sufficient to encourage a switch away from this regime. The coefficient representing the term 
spread, on the other hand, is positive and statistically significant, thus implying that an increase in 
the term spread would increase the probability of remaining in the crash regime. Therefore, a 
decrease in the spread would reduce the probability of being in the crash regime, thereby 
increasing the probability of switching to either a boom or a steady-state regime. This means that 
the interest rate spread may contain relevant forward-looking information about the future 
housing cycle beyond the information contained in the money supply and short term interest 
rates. Our finding is consistent with those in the economic literature postulating the effectiveness 
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of the yield spread in predicting future economic activities and business cycles. Many of these 
papers have found the interest rate spread to be the leading indicator of business cycles. For 
example, Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) demonstrate the usefulness of the spread between the 
10-year Treasury bond rate and the 3-month T-bill yield in predicting the probability of a 
recession in the US since 1950. Also, Haubrich and Dombrosky (1996) find that the term spread 
is an efficient forecaster of economic growth up to four quarters ahead. Other papers to have 
investigated the predictive content of yield spreads in forecasting business cycles include Dueker 
(1997), Estrella and Mishkin (1998), Dotsey (1998) and Hamillton and Kim (2000).  
Policymakers may rely on other housing-specific non-monetary policy tools in dealing with real 
estate busts. Crowe et al. (2011) evaluate the effect of macroprudential regulations and fiscal as 
well as monetary policies in dealing with real estate market booms rather than busts. They note 
that monetary policy changes may not be the most efficient way to influence the real estate 
market because these changes would affect other relevant economic factors such as the level of 
unemployment. Their study highlights possibilities that fiscal policy approaches, such as 
alterations to taxes on homeownership, could be effective in taming exuberance in the property 
market. They argue that other fiscal tools could include changes to housing transactions tax rates 
and mortgage interest tax deductibility. Crowe et al. also show that macroprudential rules, such 
as strict limits on loan-to-value ratios, also work in reducing house price booms. Given their 
findings, it may be possible that prudent property tax rate cuts and increased loan-to-value ratios 
may help the real estate market move away from the crash regime without having a significantly 
huge effect on other aspect of the economy. It would also be of interest to investigate the 
influence of fiscal tools on the regime transitions, but the lack of availability of quarterly 
information dating back to 1960 makes it impossible to statistically test this. 
 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we employ a three-state Markov switching nonlinear econometric model to 
examine the relationship between the residential real estate market and key macroeconomic   
variables in the US. We investigate the regime-dependent effects of changes to short term 
interest rates, term spread, inflation and GDP on house prices – i.e., we study the effect of these 
macroeconomic variables on house price dynamics in times of housing booms, busts and 
tranquility. The paper then proceeds to evaluate the effect of policy changes on switching 
regimes in the housing market. We find the following. First, there is statistical evidence to 
suggest there to be three distinct regimes in the housing market, namely “steady-state”, “boom” 
16 
 
and “crash” regimes. Changes to the selected macroeconomic variables significantly affect the 
dynamics of house prices in the steady-state and boom regimes only. During housing busts, 
however, the real estate market disconnects from these macroeconomic fundamentals. We also 
find evidence of varying degrees of sensitivity of house prices to changes in these economic 
variables, with prices generally being more sensitive during housing booms. We also show that 
using a standard, single-state methodology inappropriately indicates that house prices are 
responsive to changes in the short term interest rate and GDP only, thus providing an 
incomplete view of the market.  
Our second set of key findings in this study is based on the estimated probabilities of switching 
from one regime to another. We find that there is a 5% chance of moving from a housing boom 
in one quarter to a housing bust in the next quarter, but the most persistent regime is the steady-
state as there is a 98% chance of remaining within it if the housing market was previously in the 
steady-state. Third, we show that monetary policy could potentially be used as a tool to enforce a 
switch away from housing busts. Using a probit model based on the estimated filtered 
probabilities from the Markov switching model, we find there is a statistically significant and 
positive relationship between increases in the term spread and the probability of being in the 
housing crash regime, thus implying that a reduction in the spread between long and short term 
interest rates reduces the probability of being in the crash regime. Interest rates and money 
supply cannot, however, be used to instigate a switch away from a housing bust.  
Although this study provides a detailed examination of the impact of macroeconomic 
fluctuations on the housing market, we do not evaluate the effect of other non-monetary policy 
changes on the market due to data constraints, and thus further research could be conducted in 
this area. If researchers were able to access unique fiscal data, they could extend this study to 
investigate whether it is possible to use fiscal policies to enforce a transition away from housing 
busts. This would allow policymakers to judiciously select the most appropriate tools to use in 
reinvigorating a collapsing real estate market or possibly dampening demand during times of 
overheating.     
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